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.Economists are frequently accused of building
elaborate structures out of the most unlikely set of hypotheses. One
cannot help suspecting that this charge will be levelled against this
paper which makes no attempt to assess the political probability of
any agreement on a Federal relationship between Northern Ireland
and the Republic. In defense it can be argued that the object of this
paper is to examine some of the economic issues that would arise under
a federal arrangement while recognising that economic factors are unlikely
to be the sole, or dominant, influences in the future political position of
Northern Ireland.
It would not, of course
, 
be possible to explore every
aspect of the economic consequences of a Federal Ireland even under
the assumption that the structure of the economy of Northern Ireland and
the Republic remainsas it is today. Rather we shall have to be content
to examine some of the major problems that would face any proposed federation.
Thus, to some extent, the blas of thls paper will be pessimistic since it will
not concentrate on any credit slde of the balance sheet. However it must be stated
that most of the benefits, if they exist, flow from the assumed dynamic effects of
federation; which effects seem to owe more to wishful thinking than an analysis
of the present structure of both economies.
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In this paper the economic implications of
federation between Northern Ireland and the Republic are discussed in
two parts.In the first two parts we deal with the immediate problem of
U.K. transfers to Northern Ireland and the balance of payments position
that would arise because of federation. As we shall see these two issues are
very closely linked.    In the third part we shall deal with questions
of harmonization in the two parts of the federation. These could be
viewed as longer-term issues which would have to be faced by the
federation; although the principles on which harmonization would proceed
would almost certainly have to be established at the same time as the
federation came into being.
U.K. Transfers to Northern Ireland
It is an undisputable fact, in an area where : -~la~.Js aFe
thinner on the ground than opinion, that the Northern Ireland Exchequer
is a recipient of substantial net transfers from the U.K. Government.
The recent Green Paper, for example, estimates the extent of such transfers
at £313 million for 1973/74 or about 25% of Northern Ireland’s Gross Domestic
Product. The maghitude of such transfers has increased dramatically in
recent years and is in part due to the level of civil disorder in the province -
in 1968/69 for example UK subventions equalled only slightly more than 10%
of Gross Domestic Product. However a considerable part of the growth is due
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to the improvements in UK social welfare benefits wlth a consequent
increase in the amounts payable to Northern Ireland from the UK
Exchequer. Thus UK payments for social services in Northern Ireland
rose from £25 million in 1966,/67 to £82 million in 1972/73.
Regardless of the cause of such transfers, or the direct
uses to which they are put, we can, broadly speaking, examine their
impact on the Northern Irish economy. The theory of international transfers
is well developed in economics and it indicates that the effect of such
transfers will be to stimulate the level of expenditure and domestic activity
in the recipient country.    Thus the resTdents of Northern Ireland, by virtue
of the transfers received, are able to sustain a higher level of expenditures
than would otherwise be the case.    And these higher expenditures generate
i
increased demand for output and employment within the province. Of course
if the residents of Northern Ireland chose to use the transfers to acquire
imports of goods and services and foreign (i.e. non-Northern Irish) financial
assets then the level of domestic activity would not be affected by such
transfers; the level of expenditure and asset acquisition in Northern Ireland
would, however, be higher by the amount of the transfer. Professor Gibson [~[
has suggested, that the domestic multiplier in Northern
Ireland is about unity, hence a transfer of £300 million from the UK generates
output in Northern Ireland of a similar amount.*
* In the Appendix we examine both output and expenditure multipliers in the
context of Northern Ireland.     Professor Gibson’s estimates in his paper are
within the range suggested in the Appendix although optimistic expectations about the
magnitude of the marginal propensity to import would yield output multipliers
less than unity.
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It must be stressed that the impact on the Northern
Ireland economy is independent of the possibility that the current level
Of transfers is overstated by the civil dlsorder at present experienced in the
province or of the possible benefits to the UK from some of the expenditure
e.g. agricultural subsidies. If, when peace is restored, the level of
transfers falls then thls will have an impact on the on the economy unless
the present disorder has resulted in either (a) a higher than normal level
of imports (b) a reduced demand for private investment and (c) an increase
in net capital outflows from the provTnce or some combination of all three.
In other words imports of goods and services and exports of capital would
have to fall and private autonomous expenditures (i.e. those not
dependent on the level of income) would have to rlse in the advent of peace
in order to offset the assumed reduction in transfers.    Thcre is therefore
no magic sleight-of-hand whlch can suddenly reduce the effect of UK
Government transfers on the economy of the province.
As we shall see later, in our discussion of the balance of
payments impllcatlons of federatlon, there is some indirect evldence that the
level of net outflows from Northern Ireland has increased substantially since
1968. To what extent thls is due to the clvil unrest it is difficult to say.
It might be argued that one o~ the main effects of the d|sorder has been to
reduce foreign investment in the province and to encourage Northern Ireland
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investors to seek outlets for their funds elsewhere. But it is imposslble
to put any sort of a figure on these effects, if they exist. Certainly the
rate of private fixed capltal formation has fallen off since 1969 but c~t
16.5% of GDP in 1972 private investment was still well above the 12¢2%
for the United Kingdom as a whole.
Thus it seems best to proceed on the assumption that
Northern Ireland receives transfers from the UI< of slightly more than

£300 million, while recognising that in normal circumstances (i.e. peace
in the province) the effective+transfers may be considerably lower, say in the
region of £200 milllon. As has been pointed out at this conference the
burde’n of the loss of such transfers would, in the case of an independent
Northern Ireland, be borne by the residents of the province. In the case
of a federal political arrangemel~it they would be borne by both partners
in the federation. Indeed if we want to i :~-" ofn.,,,,t a note realism in~o this
discussion of federation it is unlikely that Northern Ireland would wlsh to
alter the status quo and enter a federatlon with the Republic if this involved
*    As Professor Gibson (op. cir.) has pointed out the true transfer may be
larger since the formula adopted for returning expendlture taxes to Northern
Ireland is biased in favour of the province.
+ By effective we mean the level of transfers which exceed the sum required
to offset capital outflows andreductlons in private investment caused by the
present confllct.    Thus it could be argued that £100 million, say, of the
£300 mill ion or so transfers received from the UK merely offsets the consequences
of continuing violence.
a substantial cost.
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One must therefore assume that the entire
burden would have to be borne by the Republic.
Since the substitution of subventions from the
Republic for those currentlyrecelved from the UK would not change the
economic status quo the economy of the i]epublic could expect no
offsetting benefits to flow directly from federation. Exports to Northern
Ireland could not be expected to increase nor imports fall, especially
since virtually all trade between the two areas is tariff-fl-ee. The
real question then is whether the Republic could afford to make such
a unilateral transfer to the North.    On the assumption that the funds
transferred would have to be raised via taxatTon we can see that thls would,
at 1973,/74 levels, ralse tax collections in the Republic by 43%. If this
was spread evenly over all form~, of tax revenue thls would require an income
tax lower rate of 37%, a standard rate of 50% and a first upper bracket
rate of 72%. X/AT rates would have to be increased to 8.9%, 28% and
56% compared to the present structure.    One could multiply examples of
tax increases none of whicht I suspect, would be very palatable to tax-
payers in the Republic. The fact of the matter is that the takeover by the
Republlc of current UK support for Northern Ireland would absorb 10% of
GNP in the South which is slightly more than the average growth of the economy
This does ignore the facl:’ that maintenance of the status quo,in that it
involved a continuation of the conflict~ involves substantial~ ifunmeasurable~
costs to the inhabitants of Northern Ireland.
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for two years, based on the experience since 1958. Put like that
the cost seems Somewhat more bearable but unfortunately the problem
is more complex. The withdrawal of £300 million out of the Southern
economy would have exactly the opposite effect to its injection in the
Northern Economy. Since the pr0pensity to import in the Republic
is lower than in Northern Ireland output might be expected to fall by
up to £400 million. This would reduce Government revenues further -
and would require even higher increases in taxes.    Thus the likely cost
to the economy is nearer to 15% of GNP when the induced effects of the
transfer have taken place.
One does not have to be a political savant to suggest
that the residents of the Republic would not be overjoyed by a fall in their
incomes of this magnitude, yet the only other alternative - a reduction
in the existing level of state spending in the Republic by £300 million - would
probably have an even more substantial effect on income levels. Such a
policy would mean1 for example, the abolition of the Exchequer contribution
to the Public Capital Programme and a reduction of £90 million in current
Government spending. Apart from the immediate effects, a reduction in
Government investment would seriously impalr ~he ability of the economy to
achieve a growth rate similar to that in past years and exacerbate the problem
of financing the transfers to I~lorthern Ireland on an annual basis.
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It is unlikely that a federation requiring this level
of transfers would survive. Such a transfer policy would be in sharp
distinction to federal policies in other economies wheret as ~he
Kilbrandon Report ~4 ~ polnts our, there is usually a movement of
resources from the richer to the poorer regions. Gross domestic
product (G.D.P.) per worker in Northern Ireland in 1972 was some I0°/o higher
than G.D.P. per worker |n the Republic. When adjusted for the
greater weight of agriculture in the Republic the differences between
the two economies are fairly small. But no matter what adjustments.
are made it would be impossible to justify, on i nter-reglonal equity
grounds, the transfer of substantialsums from the Republic to Northern
Ireland.
¯
The effects of" such a transfer would be to weaken
seriously the growth potential of the Republic while maintalning the
growth potentlal of Northern Ireland. In the long run the gap between
the two economies would widen and ~he justification for such unilateral
transfers would be called into question. Indeed one of the maln advantages
to the N.I. economy of the present U.K. transfers has been to sustain a h|gh
level of dornestic investment. Although the grants are ear-marked for
*     If we compare non-agricultural G.D.P. per non-agricultural worker
in the two economies~ the level in Northern Ireland is 4.4% greater than in
the Republlc. If we further adjusted for the greater weight in Northern
Ireland of public administration and defense (9.1 per cent of GDP in Nortl~ern
Ireland in 1972 compared to 6.5 per cent in the Republic) the gap falls to
2.2 per cent.
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specific purposes such as social security benefits and agricultural
supports they free .other resources of the N.I. Exchequer for
investment. In Table Ai in the Appendbi the rat|o of fixed investment
to GDP is set out for both economies sTnce 1967.    We have also set
out the share of government capital spending in GDP for the two
economies. It w|ll be seen that in every year since 1967 the
higher ratio of |nvestment in Northern Ireland is more than explained by
the higher rate of government capital expenditure. Thus private
sector investment in the Republic was relatively higher than in the North
for every year since 1967. It will be noted that the overall gap in
invesfment shares between the two economies narrowed during 1971 and 1972
although the gap between government capital expenditure shares did not.
From row 5 of~ Table AI it is clear that for every year,
except 1967, the ratio of UK grants to GDP in Northern Ireland exceeded
ihe difference in the government capital expenditure ratios between the two
economies, in short the higher capital spending by the Northern public
sector was made possible by UK transfers. Of course it could be argued
that in the absence of such transfers capital expenditure by the public
~uthorities would not fall. This would mean either an equivalent reduction
*    A wider definltion of Government capital expenditure was used here in
order to allow for the greater~e|ght of capital grants to the private sector
in the expenditure of the Republic.     See O’Loughlen ~5-~ on this point.
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in current expenditures
, 
which would have serious consequences for
aggregate demand~ or an increase in public authority borrowlng. This
latter possibility, raised recently by Simpson (6) begs the questTon of the
impact of such borrowing on private investment.    It is unlikely that
borrow|ng from domestic sources would not seriously affect the flow of
funds to the prlvate sector - unless one assumes a very large outflow
of savings due to the lack of sultable domestlc investment opportunitles.
While further external borrowlng would avoid any deleterTous effects on
private investment one could question whether the N.I. Exchequer would
be able to raise £200 - £300 million annually on UK and foreign capital
marke.ts. And the burden of interest and debt repayments would soon
requlre substantial increases in taxatlon or reductions in other expenditures.
Thus 11’ seems~fairly clear that the economy of the Republic
of Ireland~ at its pi’esent state of developmenbwould be unable to bear the
cost of the transfers received at present by ;~he Northern Ireland Exchequer from
the UK. Even if the effective level of transfers is only £200 million the
burden on the Republic’s economy would be enormous. If GDP per worker
|n the Republic grew at a rate of I    percentage point above that of Northern
Ireland it would be o~,er 20 years before a transfer of 10% of GDP could be
justified on inter-regional equity grounds. And a transfer of even 5% of
GDP could only be just]fled after at least 15 years of faster growth in the
Republic on the scale mentioned above.
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2. Balance of Payments Implications
Another important problem which would arise in
a proposed federation would be the impact of such a federation on the
balance of payments situation of the country as a whole. The effects are,
as we shall see, closely related to the problem of UK transfers discussed
above. I:1 so far as Northern Ireland runsa balance of payments
deficit, federation would exacerbate the present problem of financing
the deficit faced by the Republic.    If, on the other hand, Northern
Ireland tended to run a payments surplus then the overall payment positlon
of the two economies would improve.
Discussion of the bc~lance of payments position of
Northern Ireland is hampered by:the absence of any published statistics
on this aggregate. However, since we know that the balance of payments
must balance (i.e. a deficit must be financed from somewhere and a surplus
must be matched by the acquisition of external assets) we can infer the
magnitude of certain net flows from information that is already available.
In Appendix Table A2 we have set out in Col. i the balance of trade deficit
i
for Northern Ireland for the past decade. It has been argued (Carter and
Robson( I )) that the measurement of imports is overstated and that the true
i
* We can concentrate on the total balance of payments position of Northern
Ireland since the payments position vls avis the Republic nets out under summation.
To show this let the total balance of payments position of the two economies be
represented by
 =zi-xl+MI
BN = ZN - XN + MN
Where B is the overall deficit, Z the deficit with all other economies excluding
N. Ireland and the Republic, X exports to N. Ireland (the Republic) and M imports
from N. ireland (the Republic)and subscriptsNand ~. refer to N. Ireland and R. of
Ireland respectively. Then the combined deficit with the rest of the world is
ZI +ZN =1~ + BNslnceXN=MI andY~=MN.
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deficit is somewhat smaller. We shall however make no adjustment
since a certain amount of doubt must attach to both import and export
figures given that the bulk of the data is obtained from ]ntra - UK trade.
It will be seen that Northern Ireland has run a trade deficit in every year
in the last decade.    The deficit as a proportion of GDP has varied from
11.8% in 1963 to 1.9% in 1972. This later improvement is due
substantially to the sharp increase in textile exports and the boom in
agricultural p~-ices~ In Appendlx Table A3 the ratio of the trade deficit
to GDP is set out for both Northern Ireland and the Republic. It is clear
that the Republic has a relatlvely greater trade imbalance than Northern
Irelarid.
However in Col. 2 of Table A2 we have set out the
identified transfers from the U.~. Government and net borrowing by the
N.i. Exchequer from the U.K. Government. These resources are available
i’o meet the current trade deficit and to pr6vlde for the deficit on services less
net capital inflows. In other words Col. 3 of Table A2, which is the
diffe’rence between Cols I and 2 is equal to the net imbalance on other
accounts. We can see that the value of this residual has risen sharply since
1963 reaching an astonlshing £250 million by 1972.    This represents almost
25% of GDP and 20% of personal income in that year.
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Before we can associate the identified flows in Col. 2
of Table A2 with t.he overall balance of payments deficit in Northern
Ireland we must discuss the possibility of offsetting capital movements.
If, for example1 the capital inflow in the Republic of Ireland exceeds the
deficit on goods and services the excess will accrue in the form of external
holdings - usually by the Central Bank but possibly by an increase in the
net external assets of the banking system. It would not be appropriate
to exclude these offsetting capital movements in the measure of the
overall deficit since if the other capital inflows had not occurred the
build up of foreign assets would not have taken place. On the other hand
if private individuals offset their excess holdings of foreign resources by
bypassing the banking system and investing abroad directly then the offsets
would be included in a measure :.of the deficit - in this case as a private capital
outflow.
It is possible, for example, that’the observed inflow of
£250 million from the U.K. via grants and loans in 1972 merely resulted in a
buildup of foreign (i.e. outside Northern Ireland)assets by the banking system.
To explore this we have set out in Appendix Table A4 the estimated change
in net external assetslof the Northern Ireland banks. Since the data do not
distinguish between Northern Ireland and other U.K. depositors and leaders we have
to assume that all UK resident deposits in Northern Ireland banks are made by
Northern Ireland residents and that all UK resident advances are made to
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borrowers in Northern Ireland - this is not a particularly extreme
assumption. It is fairly clear from Table A4 that there is no evidence
of any accumulation of foreign assets by banks in Northern Ireland in 1972.
Similar data for 1973 is presented since the timing of the flows may have
mean;" a build-up in assets in 1973.    Again the evidence indicates no
external outflow via the banking system- indeed the 1973 experience
suggests an inflow.
A further possibility is that there was an enormous increase
in the net private non-bank capital outflow due to the disturbances in
Northern Ireland and that1 in the event of peace, such an outflow would
not occur. Certainly it is likely that the gross capital inflow from foreign
private investors was reduced due to the conflict and that domestic investors
increasingly sought more secure :investments abroad.
to estimate the possible magnitude of such flows.
But it is impossible
The absence of offsetting
movements in bank funds in response to the large observed inflow does indicate
the probability of substantial net outflo~ in ~971 and71972.
J
It is very likely that Northern Ireland runs a very large
deficit on invisibles. The decline in tourism has almost certainly worsened
the net imbalance in ~’ecent years.    The absence of a national airline means that
air transportation expenditure goes mainly to foreign enterprises. Similarly a
substantial amount of total freight costs would accrue to other UK shippers.
The lack of a domestic assurance industry means that premium income is remitted
outside the province - Corley ( 2 ) estimated the outflow on this account from
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Northern Ireland during 1950/51 to 1959/60 at £95.6 million. Part of the
cost of the central .operations ’of the BBC and the Post Office may be borne
¢
by Northern Ireland residents.       The cos~ of servicing the rapidly
increasing debt from the UK has also worsened the deficit on services
and invisible items. It would not be difficult to reach a figure of a
services deficit plus certain capital outflows of £150 million for 1972.
Appendix Table A5 suggests some magnitudes. These are no more than crude
guesses but they seem plausible in the light of Northern Ireland levels of
income and trade patterns.. If these figures seem plausible then it would
appear that net capital outflows, other than those defined, amounted at
least ~,100 million in 1972.
While it would be unrealistic, perhaps, to treat 1972
as a normal, peacetime, year it is clear that UK transfers play a dual role in the
x
Northern Ireland economy. They help maintain output, employment and
expenditure and sustain the substantial external deficit of the province. In the
event of a federal Ireland the Republic, if it wished to maintain living standards
in the North, would have to finance the loss of foreign (i.e. outside Ireland)
transfers. Even if, from domestic resources, the Republic were able to replace
J
UK transfers it is still likely that a balance of payments problem would arise.
*      Although on this score.some part of the Post Office deficit, financed by
the UK Government, might be* attributed to Northern Ireland.
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The reduction in income and expenditure in
the Republic caused by the transfers to Northern Ireland would undoubtedly
reduce ii~portsand reduce the deficit in the Republic. But it is unlikely
that the reduction in imports would be sufficient to finance the transfer without
any balance of payments problems. Thus a devaluation of the currency o~ the
federated area would seem necessary.
If the Republic financed the transfer to Northern
Ireland by foreign borrowing the level of activity in both parts of the federation
would be unaffected in the short run but the problem of servicing the external
debt ~,ould soon require a movement towards surplus by the Republic - and this
would require an evenmore substantial devaluation than would be required if
domestic activity bore some of the immediate impact of financing the transfer.
Of course foreign borrowing could be used to finance the difference between
the transfer and the induced fall in the Republic’s deficit. If, as the
economies became more integrated and domestic federal institutions replaced
UK ones, the service deficit in the North fell over time the devaluation required
to service the external borrowing would be quite small. But one suspects
that the short-run consequences for the balance of payments, regardless of the
method of financing the transfers, are likely to be considerable.
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3. Problems of Harmonization
Leaving aside the macro-economic questions
raised by existing U.K. transfers to Northern Ireland it is clear that any
proposed federation will have to tackle the problem of harmonizing the
levels of taxes and transf.ers in the two federal regions. Of course
such harmonization is not a necessary condltlon of federation since it is
quite possible to envisage an arrangement where both partners had a wlde
degre.e of discretion in establlshlng tax rates and social benefits. Under
such an arrangement individuals could choose, for example, between a high
tax and social welfare combination or a low tax-welfare combination. Certcin
i
restraints would have to be put on the activities of the federal regions. The
usual principle for subsidary spendlng units is that current expenditure must
not exceed current revenue. Thus higher welfare payments etc. could
not be financed out of debt creation. This prevents any tendency for the
local exchequer to expand the money supply by credit creation and
increase inflationary pressures or worsen the local and federal
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balance of payments situation. If hTgher benefits have to be paid
from higher taxes there is less incentive for the tax base in each region
to be eroded as individuals re-locate to areas with high benefits and
low taxes. Thus, even on micro-economic grounds, the assumption
of the present burden of U.K. transfers to Northern Ireland by the
Republic could not be justified since it would cause taxpayers to move
to Northern Ireland to escape hlgher taxes and enjoy higher benefits.
The tax base in the Republlc would be dlm~nlshed and the relative burden
of the transfers would increase.
Indeed it is increasingly recognized in the literature
on fiscal federalism that factor mobility makes it likely that a reglon within
a federation cannot undertake widely dlfferent tax and expenditure policies
without seriously affecting other~ regions- even to the extent of passing most
of the costs of such policies onto other members of the federation. Thus~
for example, if the rate of corporate taxatlon was substantially lower in
Northern Ireland than in the Republic there would be a tendency for new
investment to locate in the North.    This would increase the North’s tax base
and help offset the costs of the lower tax rate. But the Republic would lose
new investment. Capital per worker would decline, and increaslng
unemployment would erode the tax base further. This mlght require even
higher corporate taxes and thus exacerbate the outflow of new investment from
the Republic.
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It isl therefore, highly probable that there would have
to be a gradual harmonizatlon of social services expenditure and taxation
in the federation if the externalitles of independenl policies were to be
avoided. This ralses a question which, in the opinlon of this author,
has received little public dlscusslon in either Northern Ireland or the
Republic. it is widely accepted that, however flexibEe the practice of
parity, Northern Ireland has lit,~le say in the determination of elther the
level of benefits or taxation in force in the province. This lack of
independence would seem to be compensated for by the substantTal level of
transfers made to maintain parity. But it may be asked whether it is appropriate
for an economy like Northern Ireland, which has a GDP per head some
25-30% below that of the rest of the U.I(., to have a level of benefits in
line wlth the U.K. Few would, I feel, disagree with the argument that
i
high unemployment benefitsrelafive to earnings possibililie~ within the community
could have a disincentive effect on the supply of work effort.    While the
overall level of benefits in the U.K. may be pitched so as to avoid serious
dlslncentive effects this does not mean that in low income areas such as Northern
Ireland the level of benefits may be very high compared to earnings in
employment.
!
The same caveat applies to the Republic, where the
accepted, if unspoken, alto of social welfare expenditures~ has been to reach
a level of benefits comparable wlth the U.K. Substantial improvements have
occurred in recent years and a glance at Appendix Table A6 will show that for
insurance benefits the gap is quite small - indeed under the more favourable
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pay-related scheme in the Republic unemployed workers who had
been earnlng over £31 p.w. are better off than in the U.K. The
maln gap at present is in the level of asslstance benefits where the U.K.
level is substantially higher than the Republlc,partlcularly for larger
fami lies.
We mlght assume that, political realities being what
they are, the level of benefits in the Republic would be brought up to that
of Northern Ireland in any proposed federation. Thls ralses problems not
only of the appropriateness of such a policy but also how a harmonization might
occur. Appendix Table A7 shows transfer income from publlc authorities
as a proportion of personal income for both Northern Ireland and the Republic.
It is clear that the relative level of transfers is substantially higher in the
North. If the Republic wereito move towards this level of transfer
expenditure it would necessitate a sharp increase in taxation - just as Northern
Ireland could not finance its expenditure from domestlc resources wi~hou~
sharply increased taxation. While a policy of gradually increasing the
share of taxation in natlonal income is possible, since thls has taken place over
the last decade in any event, it is questionable whether the economic consequences
of such a policy would be deslrable.    A second possibillty would be to hold
the real level of benefits in Northern Ireland constant (i.e. adjusted only for
inflation) while gradually moving.the levels in the Republic upwards. This would
mean a declining share of transfers in Northern Ireland income and a constant1 or
slightly rising, share in the Republic.    A third possibillty is that real Northern
Ireland benefits are adjusted slightly less than .in line with real growth while
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benefits in the Republic grow slightly in excess of the real growth in
incomes. Thus the share of transfers would fall in Northern Ireland
,
and rise in the Republic.
It should be noted that these adjustment policies
would involve a cost on the Republic additional to the cost of financing
Northern Ireland transfers. The implied rise in the ratio of taxation
to income is enormous since the Republic would have to finance not only
higher real benefits for its residents but also part of the high benefits in
Northern Ireland. This would conflict with the requirement that levels
of taxation in member states be broadly in line.    Thus there would be
a substantial bdrden on the economy of the Republic in reaching the same
real level of U.K. benefits for its own inhabitants without any contribution
to Northern Ireland expenditure:on benefits.
The problems of tax harmonization are no less difficult than
those of social welfare harmonization. In the first place the Republic
depends to a Far greater extent on revenue from expenditure taxes than the
U.K. or Northern Ireland. This is because of thedifficulties of assessing
incomes of the self-employed~ notably farmers, and the consequent diminution
of the tax base+ This greater reliance on expenditure taxes, particularly in the
*    The assumption common to the various alternatives proposed is that income
in both parts of Ireland grow ~t comparable rates. Of course if income in the
Republic grew considerably faster than in Northern Ireland it would be possible to
finance higher real benefits without increasing the relative burden of taxation.
+    Prior to the tax year 1974/1975 profits from agriculture were exempt from
income taxation.    Thus in 1972, for example, some IG’CJ % of personal income
(excluding transfers) was exempt from income tax. In 1974/75 farmers with
ratable valuations in excess of £100 became liable to tax on their profits.
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last decade, has probably contributed to the higher rate of inflation
observed in the Republic. It has also meant, as a recent ICTU Bulletin
pointed out, that personal income taxes on earned income between £1,000 -
£5,000 per annum are lower in the Republic than Northern Ireland. When
the lower cost of insurance contributions in the Republic is taken into
account il is likely that the bulk of taxpayers experience a Iowe~" direct tax rate
than in the U.K. - although high income earners pay substantially higher
rates of tax in the Republic.    A harmonization of taxes on the basis of the
Republic’s structure would mean a sharp increase in prices in Northern Ireland;
harmonization on the basis of Northern Ireland’s structure would mean higher
tax payments For most of the Republic’s taxpayers (and certain non-taxpayers
such as farmers with valuations under £100) and lower prices. Without a
lengthy and difficult analysis it is not easy to compare the two possibilities
but it does seem, impressionistically at least, that harmonization of the
Republic’s tax s~ructure on the basis of that in Northern Ireland would
result in a substantial fall in revenue.
One area where tax harmonization is likely to be particularly
troublesome is that of corporate taxation. The industrial development
strategy of the Republic has used the tax structure to a considerable extent to
encourage investment.    Thu’s generous depreciation allowances are granted and
profits from exports are tax-free.    In contrast Northern Ireland has been unable
to use the tax structure to encourage investment and depends more on direct
grants, government factory construction and regional employment premiums.
* Recently there has been criticism of the industrial strategy adopted in the
Republic in that it tends to favour capital-investment industries. Thus some
movement towards regional employment premiums or employment-oriented aids
might occur in the Republic over the next few years.
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It is hardly feasible, given the balance of,payments position in the
Republic and its level of development, to contemplate the abolition
of ~-hese alds - air’hough eventually they will have to be phased out
under the Treaty of Rome provisions.    If a federal Ireland were to
avoid the possibility of a self-defeating escalation in ~|~ducements to
investors the overall development strategy would have to be harmonized
and thls could mean the extension to Northern Ireland of tax-exemption on
exports for at least as long as the EEC permits.
In my v|ew one of the major sources of conflict within
the proposed federation would be the determination of approprlate
development and stabilization policies. Relations between the Federal
and provincial governments are unlikely to come under much strain when
both parts of the economy are er!.joying boom conditions. But when counter-
cyclical measures have to be adopted, say to protect foreign reservesr how
will the burden of adjustment be distributed?    When one realizes that
external disturbances, which require remedial action, may vary |n thelr effects
¯ on the province~ the problem is hlghlighted. Suppose there is a downturn in
world agricultural prices which turns the terms of trade against the federated
economy. Those in Northern Ireland, where agrlculture is less than 10%
of GDPr might feel aggrieved at bearing part of the burden of adjustment caused
by poor tradlng conditions in the Republic.    Similularly a decline in the
fortunes of the textile industry would affect Northern Ireland more than the
Republic but Federal stabilizatlon policy would requ|re the adjustment to be
spread over the whole communlty. Since nominal control of the money supply
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and foreign reserves would have to be centralized and major taxes
harmonized it seems clear that the major stabilization measures would
have to be decided at federal level. But the apportionment of
budget cuts or the allocation of capital expenditure increases would
involve a considerable measure of political co-operation. It would
be impossible to operate a federal system for Ireland without substantial
pol.itlcal agreement by both parties that such a system was of advantage
in the long-term.
One could continue to multiply areas where problems
of harmon|zation would arise - health and educational services, agriculture
(although decreasingly so as full EEC rules are adopted)¯ transport etc. Such an
i
item by item examination would’ fill several books rather than a short
conference paper.    What is surprising is that those whose aim, albeit very
long-term, is a federal ~(united) Ireland, have not undertaken any study of the
longer term economic consequences.
Concl usions
It will be clear from the tenor of this paper, if it was not
already clear before, that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for the Republic of Ireland to bear the present cost of U.K. transfers to Northern
Ireland. Indeed even if the U.K. as part of a polltical settlement were prepared
to continue the transfer payments at thelr existing level for an extended period,
the economy of the Republic would have to bear the considerable burden of
adjusting its tax and welfare benefits in line with Northern Ireland.
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But, in concluding, I shouid perhaps glve some, if
not equal, tTme to those who support a federal solutlon.    Clearly if the
EEC makes considerable advances towards unification, including the
harmonizatlon of taxes and social security, (Grid ~f the U.K. remains part
of the EEC) the problems outlined earlier would be much dim|nished.
It Ts possible, even if on the outer bounds of probabilTty, that ITving standards
in Ireland will be maintaTned by EEC transfers which would be unaffected by
the political arrangements between North and South. The adoptTon of a
federal negative income tax in place of social welfare and insurance benefits
North and South might allow the harmonization of personal transfer payments
in the island without obvious inter-regional transfers. A continuation of U.K.
payments at thelr cun~’ent levels for quite a while would be requlred if the
living standards in the federal aliea were to be ma~ntaihed. But a
continuation of the faster rate of growth in Ireland relatlve to Great Britain
af:
could allow the eventual transfer of the costs/bll social expenditure to the
federal structure wlthout any decrease ~n the existing real level-although thls
could mean that the guaranteed income payments in a Federal Ireland were lower,
in real terms~ than comparable benefits in Great Britain, s|nce the latter might
well increase substantially Tn real terms.
*       I thTnk, however, thc~t agreernent is likely to be dTfficult enough to
reach in three capTtals~ Dublin, Belfast and London without hypothesizing the
involvement of a fourth, Brussels, in any solution.
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Whether the federalists like it or not where will be
costs involved. These may have to be borne immediately or by
some phased agreement wlth the U.K. The difference might be
between having one’s car stolen or having it rust away; either way
you lose the car. The problem for a federation is how to finance, in
as equitable way as possible, given political realities, the replacement
of that car. I have attempted, in this paper, to give some indications
of the sort of costs involved in a federation and the economic problems
that have to be faced. Hopefully this will contribute something to a
discussion o~l the economic realities, as distinct from aspirations, of the
Republlc and Northern Ireland.
Appendix I
Output and Expenditure Multipliers
I. Basic Model
There is some confusion over the multiplier effects of
fiscal policy on domestic product compared to domestic expenditure.
In order to analyse the problem we make use of a fairly simple macro-
economic model. First we kaow that G.D.P. at factor cost, as
measured by observations on output data equals G.D.P. at market
prices, as measured by expenditure data, less taxes on expenditure plus
subsidies. If we ignore indirect taxes we can write
Y=C+I+G+X--M
where Y equals G.D.P. at factor cost and all expenditure variables are
net of indirect taxes. C = private consumption, I = private investment,
G = Government expenditure on current goods and services plus capital
expenditure, X = exports and M = imports. We suppose the following
behavioural relationships
(a)
where
with
Thus
We also assume
(b) M=m +mY
0
where m is the marginal propensity to import.
Thus we can write the national income identity as
So that
C =a+bYD
YD=y+TR- T
TR = Government transfers to persons
T = Government direct tax receipts.
C =a +b (Y- T’) where T’ = T - TR
Y(1 -b+m) =a-bT"+I+ G+X- m
0
8Y = 1 and 8y = -b
aG 1-b+m i~T’ 1-b+m
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Some values for
m on Table 1.
aY/9 G and
ay
ar---
~ 
are given for different values of b and
"Table 1
Output Multiplier Effects for Various Paramter Values
m = .85
b = .75
8O
85
9O
m = 90
b = 75
8O
.85
90
m = 95
b = 75
80
85
90
1 b 1-b
1-b+m 1-b+m 1-b+m
¯ 91 .68 .23
.95 .76 .19
1.0 .85 .15
1.05 .95 .I0
i "87 .65 .22
¯ 91 .73 .18
¯ 95 .81 .14
1.0 .90 .10
.83 .63 .20
.87 .70 .17
¯ 91 .77 .14
.95 .86 .09
Suppose however, that we must ensure that the budget surplus increases
by £300 million and that this can be done by tax and transfer changes, AT’,
or by expenditure cuts, h:], or some combination of both.
Thus AG- AT’ = -300
or AG+ 300 = AT’
4’
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Then AY
1 b
1-b+m A.G 1-b+m    ( AG + 300)
1-b                 b5G (3.00)1-b+m          1-b+m
It is fairly clear that any reduction in G, as a part of the movement
towards surplus, Will increase the depressing effect on Y. This is due
to the familiar balanced budget theorem.
II. Changing the Model Specification
Suppose we believe that the propensity to consume out of
transfers is different from the propensity to consume out of other income.
Let us ~ssume it equals 1.
Then C = b(Y- T) +T1R
Further suppose that imports vary with C, G, X and I separately.
Then
M = mo + talC + m2I + m3G + m4X
and we get
Y(1 - b(1 - ml) ) = - b (1 - rn~T + (1-ml)T1R+(1-m2)I+(1-m3)G+(1-m4)X
whence
8Y
8G
1-m3 ~ 8Y -b(1- ml) 0Y 1- m1
1-b(l-ml); 8T 1 - b (1 - ml) 8TR 1 -b (l-ml)
The multipliers, for certain values of ml, m3 and b are given in Table 2.
We should note that the values in (a) are more compatible with observed
behaviour in N. Ireland although the coefficients m1
1high.
and m3 would seem
IThe ratio of imports to total final expenditure is M/C + I + G + X which
equals M/GDP + M. Since M/GDP is about . 90 this implies    that the
ratio of imports to total final expenditure is about 0.47. Thus if m_ = 0.6
1
andre = 0.5thenm andre must be below 0.47. The experience of the3 2 4Republic of Ireland suggests that m and m lie above m and m ; this
2 -4 1 3indicates that the assumed values in (a) of Table 2 are high although the
marginal propensities may be above the average.
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Table 2
Output Multiplier effects under different assumptions about
Parameter Values
mI m3 b 8y/8 G 8 y/O T
R 8y/8T
(a) 0.6 ¯ 0.5 0~ 9 0.78 0.63
-0.57
(b) o. 7 o. 6 o. 9 o. 55 o. 41 -0.37
(c) 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.37 0.24 - 0.22
We should note that the multipliers exclude the possible
endogenity of fiscal pelicy. Thus for By/8(3 it is assumed that
hTR = AT = 0. Similarly, for 8¥/8TR the assumption is that AG = AT = 0.
This means that the multipliers are overstated visa vis conventional
multipliers which make taxes endogenous. But since expenditure on
transfers may also be endogenous the multipliers in Table 2 could be
understated. However, the multipliers do give the impact of a fall of £300
million in the Government deficit i(rise in Governmentsurplus) required to finance
a drop in transfer receipts. This differs from a fail of £300 million
in Government expenditure when taxes are endogenous since revenues will
also fall and the deficit will fall by less than £300 million.
Comparison of Income and Expenditure Effects
We can see from the equations for the multipliers above that
it is possible, given high import propensities, to derive values which
imply no change in GDP. But if we look at total final expenditure (TFE)
we can see that it is not possible to get zero effects.
We know, by definition, that
TFE = GDP + M
So that using first differences and assuming A I =
AC + 5G= AY +AM
(1) Changes in Government Expenditure
8C _ ~ 8Y - b. (l-m3)
8G 8Y 8G 1-b. .(1-ml~
/X X = 0 we obtain
=’TAC _
b (l-m3)
AG
1-b (1-ml)
Thus
b(l - m3)
AY + AM = 1 + AG
l-b(l-ml)
Which cannot fall below 1 for any positive value of b, m3 and ml. Thus
Total Final Expenditure will fall by at least as much as the fall in G and
may fal[ more. The increment in the fail is equal to b times the
induced fail in GDP.
(b) Changes in Taxes
8C 8C BY
8T 8Y 8T
8Y -b(l-ml)
b = b ( 8T I) = b( l_b(l+ml) -I)
-b
l-b (l-ml)
which.for positive values of b, mI ~<1 can only approach -b.
Thus AC + AG=AY + AM implies for AG =O.
AY+ Al~{ -    -b      IAT
l-b(l-mI)
In this case it is possible that domestic income would not fall - if lfi1 = 1 -
and that imports would fall by less than the increase in taxes. This is due
to the fact that savings bear part of the brunt of the fall in after-tax
income as long as b < 1. We should note that if the TFE multiplier is < 1
and domestic taxes replace transfers received from abroad there will be
balance of payments implications (since Am < fall in international transfers)
which we do not explore here.
(c) Changes in Transfers
_ 8C 8Y    + I = b ~ Y + 1 - b(l-ml)
8TR      8Y 8 TR           8 TR         l-b(l-ml)
+I
1
Hence gy +AM -
1 ATR
1-b (1-mI) 1-b(1-ml)
Clearly here, for any plausible assumption about m1 and b, the
multiplier cammt fall below unity. In the limiting case where m1 = 1
all transfer receipts are used to purchase consumer imports so that
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TFE and M fall by the same amount.
The multiplier effects on TFE for certain values of ml, m3
and b are set out in Table 3. It will be noted that in all cases the implied
fall in imports will be less than the fall in transfers - since the coefficients
in Table 3 minus those in Table 2 are less than .
one. Thus the equilibrium reached can only be considered a quasi-
equilibrium since the conse¢ uenees of an external deficit are not dealt
with here.
Conc lus ion s
It would seem that the multiplier effects on domestic output
of a reduction in transfers to N. Ireland of £ 300 million could range from about
0.50 to 0, 80 depending on the manner in which the reduction was effected
Table 3
Final Expenditure Multipliers under different assumptions about
Parameter Values
mI m3 b A y + AM/~ A Y + AM/A TR Ay + AM/AT
(a) 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.70 1.41 1.56
~) 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.49 1.23 1.37
(c) 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.33 1.10 1.22
This range seems to be the most optimistic since the assumptions concerning
marginal import coefficients ate on the high side. The impact on total
expenditure is likely to be in the range 1.50 to 1.80 so that total consum-
ption mid investment could be expected to fall by between £450 to £540
million. Indeed since we have assumed private investment autonomous
the multiplier effects are probably biased downwards.
\
It might also be noted that the range of GDP multipliers
derived here are similar to those of Gibson ( 3 ) who used rather lower
marginal propensities to import in his specification. However, since he
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made taxes and transfers endogenous his multipliers will tend to be lower.
But by the same token the increase in taxes or reduction in Government
spending required to effect a budgetary saving of £300 million would be
greater than £300 million when the fiscal variables are made endogenous.
Table AI
Fixed Investment~ Government Capital Expenditure and U.K. Transfers
as a percentage of GDP, Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland
1967 - 1972
per cent
Ratio of GDFCF to GDP
1. Northern Ireland
2. Republic of Ireland
Difference (I-2)
Ratio of Govt. Cap. Exp.
to GDP
3. Northern Ireland
4. Republic of Ireland
Difference (3-4)
Ratio of UK Grants to GDP
5. Northern Ireland
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
29.8 32..I 32.8 33.4 31.7 30.8
22.8 23.7 26.7 25.9 27.2 25.9
7.0 8.4 6.1 7.5 4.5 4.9
19.0 18.2 18.5 19.1 19.2 17.6
8.6 9.2 11.3 9.3 10.1 9.3
10.4 9.0 7.2 9.8 9.1 8.3
9.9 10.6 9.8 10.4 13.4    16.6
Definitions:
Source:
GDFCF = Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation.
Government Capital Expenditure is defined as total
capital expenditure by public authorities less loan
repayments and international capital transfers,
Northern Ireland: Digest of Statistics and HMSO
Nort, hern Ireland: Finance and the Economy
Repdblic of Ireland: National Income and Expenditure
Table A2
Balance of Payments Positlon of Northern Ireland 1963 - 1972
Balance of Trade Deficit
(1)
1963 52.2
1964. 46.9
1965 55.8
1966 46¯ 5
1967 44.7
1968 63.5
1969 59.3
1970 83.6
1971 ¯ 49.O
1972 2O. 4
£ million
UK Transfers and Loans1
(2)
53.2
52¯ 9
63.7
73.7
88 6
96 5
108.4
145.2
190.0
269.7
2
Residual
(3) = (2) - (I)
I¯0
6.0
7.9
27.2
43¯9
33.0
49. I
61.6
141.0
249.3
¯ Transfers from UK Govt¯ (including agricultural subsidies).plus
borrowing by Northern Ireland Exchequer from National Loans
fund les__/s repayments in respect of such borrowing.
¯ Equals deficit on invisible account plus net private capital outflows.
Source: Northern Ireland Digest of Statistics and Northern Ireland Finance and
the Economy (HMSO, 1974).
Table A3
Ratio of Balance of Trade Deficit to GDP in Northern Ireland and
Re_epublic of Ireland 1965 - 1972
Northern I reland
Republic of Ireland
per cent
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 !,970 1971 1972
10.1 7.9 7.0 9.1 7.9 9.9 5.2 1.9
17.4 14.1 10.3 t4.1 16~9 15.3 13.7 10.2
Source: Northern Ireland Digest of Statistics, C.S.O. (Dublin) National
Income and Expenditure
Table A4
1Net Outflows through Northern:Ireland Clearing Banks, 1972 and 1973
Change in 1972 1973
1. Net Liabilities to UK Banks
-26 -15
2. Net Liabilities to non-UK residents
-7 -63
3. Shor.~ term Asset holdings 2 4 28
4. Certificates of Deposits 28 9
Net Outflows 3 (Inflow = -)
-I.0 -41.0
£ million
Notes:
1. An increase in net liabilities is entered as a negative item and an increase
in net assets as a pDsitive item.
Cash and balances with Bank of England plus money at Call and Short notice.
Excludes changes in holdings of U.K. Government stocks which fell by
£7 million in 1972 and by £12 million in1973. If this reduction was due
entirely to sale of G.B. securities the net inflow would be increased in 1972
and 1973 by the amount of the sale.
,
3.
¯ Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin
Table A5
Possible Magnitudes of Northern Ireland Invisibles Deficit 1972
Tourism, Transportr Shipping
Life Assurance,Contractual Payments, Small Savlngs1
Dividends and Interest2
Other Services
£mi Ili on
45
40
30
35
150
1. Strictly speaking an outflow due to small savings in U.K. financial
institutions is not an invisible item and should be included in
the capital account.
2. In.cludes interest on U.K. loans to Northern Ireland Exchequer
estimated at about £25 million for 1972. Thus net private
interest payments are assumed small.
Table A6
Comparative Social Security Benefits, Northern Ireland and Republic of
Ireland 1974.
£’s per week
Unemployment Insurance:
N. Ireland R. of Ireland
Married Man
(flat rate) 13.90 12.80
Married Man
+ 2 children 18.40 17.20
Married Man 1(pay related) 22.31 23.84
Married Man 1
+ 2 children
C__ontributory Retirement Pension: Single
Ma rri ed
Non Contributory Old Age Pension! Single
Married
Unemployment Assistance: Married Man
+ 2 children
Childrens Allowances: 2 children
26.81 28.24
10.0 8.50
16.0 14.0
8.402 7.30
13.65 2 10.95
18.953 14.854
0.9O5 I. 29
2.90 3.164 chi Idren
Notes:
1. Assumed earnings 91:£40 p.w.
2. Rent payments are also made
3. Assumed I child under 5 and I between°5 and 10. Rent payments are also
made.
4. Urban rate
5. Only 2nd child is eligible in U.K. and Northern Ireland.
Table A7
11
~P
Share of Public Authorities~ Transfers in Personal Income, 1965- 1972
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
197O
1971
1972
Republic of Ireland
7.4
7.9
7.9
8.3
9.0
9.8
10.4
10.2
per cent
Northern Ireland
13.2
13.4
14.1
14.8
14.9
14.1
14.6
16.1
Source: Northern Ireland: Digest of Statistics and HMsC)
Northern Ireland: Finance and the Economy
Republic of Ireland: National Income and Expenditure
Note: Transfers to private non-profit making institutions such as schools,
universities etc. were excluded flom the measure of public
authorities’ transfers for the Republic of Ireland.
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